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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
ORVILLE K. WROLSTAD, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, INTERSTATE ELECTRIC 
COMPANY and/or HOME INSURANCE/ 
HOME INDEMNITY, 
RESPONDENTS. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 890052CA 
Category No. 6 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ORVILLE K. WROLSTAD 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
an order of the Utah State Industrial Commission pursuant to 
Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for review of an order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on appeal are as 
follows: 
1. Does the statute of repose found in the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law offend the "open courts" 
provision of the Utah Constitution by failing to provide an 
effective and reasonable remedy to an injured worker? 
2. Does the Occupational Disease Disability Law impose 
a statute of repose arbitrarily to the claims of victims of 
certain occupational diseases in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Utah Constitution? 
DETERMINITIVE PROVISIONS 
Article 1, Section 11, Utah Constitution [Courts Open -
Redress of Injuries]: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or repu-
tation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or un-
necessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party." 
Article 1, Section 24, Utah Constitution [Uniform 
Operation of Laws]: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation*" 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-2-13(a), Employer Liability for 
Compensation - Conditions when no payment to be made: 
(a) There is imposed upon every employer a 
liability for the payment of compensation to every 
employee who becomes totally disabled by reason of 
an occupational disease subject to the following 
conditions: 
(1) No compensation shall be paid when 
the last day of injurious exposure of the 
employee to the hazards of said occupational 
diseases shall have occurred prior to the 
effective date of this act. 
(2) No compensation shall be paid for a 
disease other than silicosis unless total 
disability results within one year from the 
last day upon which the employee actually 
worked for the employer against whom compen-
sation is claimed/ provided, that an employee 
whose disablement or death was due to occupa-
tional exposure to ionizing radiation, a claim 
for such compensation shall (notwithstanding 
the provisions of Section 35-1-48) be filed 
within one year after the date upon which the 
employee first suffered incapacity from the 
exposure to radiation and either knew or in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have known that the occupational disease was 
caused by his present or prior employment* 
(3) No compensation shall be paid in 
case of silicosis unless during the fifteen 
years immediately preceding the disablement, 
the injured employee shall have been exposed 
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide 
(Si02) dust for a total period of not less 
than five years in this state and unless total 
disability results within (a) three years in 
case of silicosis not complicated by active 
tuberculosis, or (b) five years in case of 
silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis, 
from the last day upon which the employee 
actually worked for the employer against whom 
compensation is claimed* 
(4) No claim shall be maintained nor 
compensation paid unless the claim has been 
filed with the commission in writing within 
the time fixed by the appropriate subdivision 
of Section 35-1-48. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about February 23, 1988, Orville K. Wrolstad 
filed an occupational disease claim with the Utah State 
Industrial Commission. Mr. Wrolstad claimed that he suffered 
from the occupational disease of pleural asbestosis as a 
result of his exposure to asbestos in the course of his 
employment with Interstate Electric Company. A Motion to 
Dismiss was filed by the respondents in which it was asserted 
that the claim was barred by the Section 35-2-13(a), Utah Code 
Ann, The Motion to Dismiss was granted by Judge Timothy C. 
Allen on the 1st day of September 1988. A Motion for Review 
was filed by the applicant. The Industrial Commission of Utah 
denied this Motion by Order dated January 23, 1989. A peti-
tion to the Utah Court of Appeals was taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Orville K. Wrolstad, a resident of Phoenix, Arizona, 
was employed by Interstate Electric Company for a period of 18 
months within the state of Utah. (R.13) 
2. Mr. Wrolstad*s employment with Interstate Electric 
Company occurred during the years 1976 to 1977. (R.36,41) 
3« Mr. Wrolstad claimed that during his employment with 
Interstate Electric Company, he was exposed to asbestos. (R*l) 
4. On February 5, 1987, Orville Wrolstad was diagnosed 
as suffering from pleural asbestosis. (R.9) 
5. The applicant claims to have been exposed to 
asbestos while employed in the state of Arizona in 196 2, while 
employed in the state of North Dakota in 1962, 1963, 1964, 
1966, and 1968, and while employed in South Dakota in 1961 and 
1968. (R.38, 38, 44, 45 and 46) 
6. The applicant filed a first report of injury with 
the Utah State Industrial Commission on or about March 30, 
1987 wherein he claimed that he suffered from asbestosis and 
that the last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred while 
employed in Utah with Interstate Electric Company. (R.l) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute of repose found in the Utah occupational 
disease law offends the "open courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution* To survive a constitutional attack, legislative 
enactments which modify the rights of injured parties must 
provide an effective and reasonable alternative remedy or must 
employ reasonable means to eliminate a clear social or 
economic evil. The short statute of repose found in the Utah 
occupational disease law unreasonably denies victims of 
asbestosis a just and fair remedy for their injury. 
The Utah occupational disease law singles out 
victims of radiation exposure and excepts them from the one 
year statute of repose. By treating disabled workers dif-
ferently when the cause of the disability is radiation 
exposure, the occupational disease law offends the equal 
protection clause of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN THE UTAH OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE DISABILITY LAW VIOLATES THE OPEN 
COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Mr. Wrolstad, born in 1923, has worked throughout 
his life as a union electrician. Shortly before Mr. Wrolstad 
reached retirement age, he was diagnosed as suffering from 
asbestosis. Mr. Wrolstad filed occupational disease claims in 
several states where he believed he was exposed to asbestos* 
Mr. Wrolstad has alleged in his occupational disease claim 
that he was exposed to injurious levels of asbestos when 
employed with Interstate Electric in the state of Utah in 1976 
and 1977. Mr. Wrolstad terminated his employment with Inter-
state Electric in 1977. 
Asbestosis is a form of lung disease caused by the 
inhalation of asbestos dust. Asbestos is a generic term used 
to describe a number of naturally occurring fibrous, hydrated 
mineral silicates. As with other forms of lung disease, there 
is a latency period or lag time in the development of asbestos 
related health effects. It is believed that the latency 
period between asbestos exposure and diagnosis of a disease is 
between fifteen and forty years and varies within diseases. 
See Asbestos Associated Diseases, Science, Public Policy and 
Litigation, Dr. Hans Weill, "Chest", November 1983. 
The Utah Supreme Court in its consideration of the 
constitutionality of the Products Liability Act noted that 
"chemicals such as asbestos and vinyl chloride, can cause 
disease and death many years after exposure." Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985). 
When the Utah Legislature adopted an occupational 
disease law, it abolished the common law right of an employee 
to maintain an action against an employer for disease or 
injuries to health sustained by an employee which arise out of 
or in the course of his employment. This common law right was 
replaced with an administrative procedure which was designed 
to provide disabled employees with an efficiently administered 
remedy. Masich v. United States Smelting; Refining and Mining 
Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948). 
The occupational disease law adopted by the Utah 
Legislature imposes liability for asbestosis on the worker's 
last employer in whose employment the worker was injuriously 
exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Section 35-2-14, Utah 
Code Ann. All prior employers of the worker are immune from 
liability regardless of the exposure. The occupational 
disease law contained its own statute of limitations. A claim 
for asbestosis must be filed within one year after the cause 
of action arises. The cause of action is deemed to arise "on 
the date the employee first suffered incapacity from the 
occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able diligence should have known, that the occupational 
disease was caused by his employment." Section 35-2-49, Utah 
Code Ann. 
In addition to a statute of limitations, the Utah 
occupational disease law contains a statute of repose. A 
statute of repose is a time bar to a cause of action that runs 
from an occurrence of an event other than the occurrence of 
the injury that gives rise to the cause of action. The 
statute of repose found in the occupational disease law runs 
from the date on which a worker terminates his employment with 
a particular employer. In the case of asbestosis, a worker is 
barred from maintaining an occupational disease claim unless 
he becomes totally disabled within one year from the date the 
worker was last employed by the employer against whom compen-
sation is claimed. Section 35-2-13(a)(2), Utah Code Ann. 
In passing the statute of repose, the Utah 
Legislature recognized that occupational diseases caused by 
ionizing radiation have a long incubation period and afforded 
workers suffering from this disease a statute of repose that 
is identical to the statute of limitations for occupational 
diseases. 
In light of the latency period of asbestosis, the 
statute of repose found in the occupational disease law 
effectively denies many workers suffering from this disease a 
remedy. See Tisco Intermountain v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987). 
Mr. Wrolstad contends that the statute of repose 
found in the Occupational Disease Disability Law offends the 
"open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution. The open 
courts provision provides, in part, that: "Every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law . . . ." This consti-
tutional provision has been construed to impose limitations on 
a legislature when it passes laws which modify the rights of 
those persons who have been injured in their person, property 
or reputation• 
Balancing the "open courts" provision with the 
necessary legislative prerogative to pass laws that promote 
the public health, safety, morals and welfare, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted a two part analysis to be used in 
scrutinizing a legislative enactment to determine whether it 
offends the "open courts" provision. 
"First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides 
an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy 'by due course of law1 for 
vindication of his constitutional interest• The 
benefit provided by this substitute must be sub-
stantially equal in value or other benefit to the 
remedy abrogated in providing essentially compar-
able substantive protection to one's person, 
property or reputation, although the form of the 
substantive remedy may be different. . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause 
of action may be justified only if there is a clear 
social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 717 P.2d 
at 680. 
The intent, purposes and objectives of the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Act are similar to those of 
the Worker's Compensation Act. Masich v. United States 
Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., supra. Both are designed 
to eleviate hardship upon workers and their families when dis-
abling work-related injuries occur. Baker v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965). The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the Workers Compensation Act 
should be liberally construed to afford coverage to an 
employee during a time of need. Produce v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 652 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1983). 
The statute of repose found in the Utah occupational 
disease law serves to defeat the purpose of the law rather 
than to further its purpose. 
The Utah Products Liability Act was found to be 
arbitrary and unreasonable in part because the statute of 
repose did not consider the useful life of the product. Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra. Similarly, in this case, with 
the exception of silicosis and diseases caused by radiation 
exposure, the Act applies to all other diseases, irrespective 
of whether the disease has a long latency period following the 
injurious exposure. The occupational disease law has failed 
to keep pace with advances in medicine which have resulted in 
a greater understanding of certain occupational diseases. 
The statute of repose found in the Utah Occupational 
Disease Law fails to satisfy the two part analysis set forth 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
supra. This short statute of repose effectively denies many 
victims of asbestosis an adequate remedy as their cause of 
action is barred before they become disabled as a result of 
the disease. Secondly, this short statute of repose is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the law which is to provide 
an adequate remedy for workers who contract an occupational 
disease in the course of their employment. Accordingly, this 
court should find Section 35-2-13(a)(2) to be unconstitu-
tional. 
Section 35-2-13(a)(2) is severable from the balance 
of the Act. 
"Severability, where part of an Act is uncon-
stitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative 
intent . . . which generally is determined by 
whether the remaining portions of the Act can stand 
alone and serve a legitimate legislative purpose." 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft, supra, at 686. 
By striking the statute of repose from the Occupational 
Disease Law, the balance of the legislation provides workers a 
compensable scheme designed to assist workers in a time of 
need. The legislation has a relatively short limitation 
period of one year which will protect employers from stale 
claims. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE FOUND IN THE OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE DISABILITY LAW VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
STANDARDS FOUND IN THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The principal of egual protection is set forth in 
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution: "All laws of 
a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that although dissimilar, this language 
embodies the same principal as the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. It embraces the notion that 
"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if 
their circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661 at 669 (Utah 1984)• 
In assessing whether a statute meets equal protec-
tion standards, a court must consider the objectives of the 
statute and whether the classifications contained therein 
provide a reasonable basis for promoting these objectives* 
"When persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or group 
of persons from among a larger class on the basis 
of a tenuous justification that has little or no 
merit." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held the Utah Guest Statute 
unconstitutional as incapable of reasonably furthering its 
statutory objectives. 
The Utah Occupational Disease Law unlawfully dis-
criminates between victims of uranium exposure and victims of 
asbestos. The law recognizes the latency period for lung 
cancer and other diseases caused by radiation exposure and 
therefore excepts victims of radiation exposure from the 
statute of repose. However, workers who inhale asbestos dust 
and contract asbestosis are not similarly treated. They are 
subject to a short statute of repose which prevents recovery 
against an employer if more than one year has elapsed since 
the worker has terminated his employment. No reasonable basis 
exists for allowing disabled workers to avoid the statute of 
repose if they suffer from lung cancer caused by radiation 
exposure but subjecting them to a short statute of repose if 
they suffer lung cancer caused by the inhalation of asbestos 
dust. In both cases, the diseases commonly occur years after 
the intitial exposure. 
The Legislature has adopted an occupational disease 
law to provide an expedient remedy for victims of occupational 
diseases. Victims of radiation exposure have been singled out 
and excepted from the statute's short statute of repose. 
Undoubtedly, the Legislature recognized the need to except 
victims of radiation exposure from the effect of the law's 
statute of repose due to the latency period between the ini-
tial exposure to radiation and the presence of the disease. 
Yet, other diseases with latency periods are not treated simi-
larly but subjected to a short statute of repose which often 
results in the denial of benefits for a worker who becomes 
totally disabled as a result of a injurious exposure on his 
job. 
Accordingly, this court should find the statute of 
repose in violation of the egual protection standards of the 
Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner reguests that the court find the statute 
of repose found in the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law unconstitutional and sever it from the balance of the law. 
DATED this 1(5 day of April, 1989. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
By ^Marnti-bJzmACth./v£ 
William W. Downes, Jr. 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ 
Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that ^ true and correct copies 
of the foregoing instrument were mailed, postage prepaid, on 
the 1Q day of April, 1989 to the following counsel of 
record: 
Theodore E. Kanell 
HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C* 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Interstate Electric Company 
and Home Insurance/Home 
Indemnity 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
iA)4lAani W. IWnQA^WKff 
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Exhibit A: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order of Administrative Law Judge dated 
September 1, 1988. 
Exhibit B: Order Denying Motion for Review dated 
January 23, 1989. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 38000191 
ORVILLE WROLSTAD, * 
* 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
v s . * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and/or * AND ORDER 
HOME INSURANCE/HOME INDEMNITY * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PRE-HEARING Hearing Room 334, Industr ia l Commission of Utah, 160 
CONFERENCE: East 300 South, Sa l t Lake City, Utah, on August 30, 
1988 at 2:00 p.m. o 'c lock . Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Coxnmission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Al len, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was represented by William K. Downes, 
J r . , Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney at Law. 
The defendants, by and through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the 
application in this matter, on the grounds that the statute of limitations had 
run. Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge referred the matter to the 
hearing clerk for the scheduling of a pre-trial hearing. Having had the 
benefit of legal argument, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter 
the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Orville K. Wrolstad filed an occupational disease claim with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah on February 25, 1988, alleging that he has 
contracted the occupational disease of pleural asbestosis as the result of his 
employment with Interstate Electric for the period 1977 to 1978. The 
defendants, by and through counsel, made a motion to dismiss the application 
on the grounds that the applicant's claim was not timely filed, in that the 
defendants feel that the applicant knew or should have known by February 5, 
1987, that his condition was work related, and accordingly his claim should 
CVUID1T A 
ORVILLE WROLSTAD 
ORDER 
PAGE TOO 
have been filed no later than February 8, 1988. The applicant, contends that 
he filed a claim on June 18, 1987, when he submitted an employer's first 
report completed by himself and a report from Dr. Kilburn indicating that he 
had asbestosis. The Administrative Law Judge would concur that for the notice 
requirement, that the applicant's filing of June 18, 1987, would satisfy the 
statute of limitations requirement. 
However, the defendants raise an additional defense, namely that 
contained in Section 35-2-13 of the Occupational Disease Act. Section 13 
provides: "No compensation shall be paid for a disease other than silicosis 
unless total disability results within one year from the last day upon which 
the employee actually worked for the employer against whom compensation is 
claimed; . . , ." The applicant's answers to interrogatories indicates that 
he last worked for Interstate Electric in 1976. Accordingly, for the 
applicant's claim to have been timely, it should have been filed no later than 
1977. Therefore, while it gives the Administrative Law Judge no pleasure to 
deny the applicant's occupational disease claim, I am bound to follow the 
express statutory provisions of the law. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the occupational disease claim of 
Orville Wrolstad against Interstate Electric should be, and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, for failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations contained in Section 35-2-13, Utah Code Annotated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on September / , 1988 a copy of the attached 
ORDER in the case of Orville Wrolstad issued September 2 was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addressest postage paid: 
Orville K. Wrolstad 
2423 East Aster Drive 
Phoenix, A2 85032 
William X. Downes, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South #4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Home Insurance 
6000 Greenwood Plaza Blvd 
Greenwood Village, Colo 80111 
Attn: Pamela Morrison 
Theodore Kanell 
Attorney at Law 
175 South West Temple #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By 
Sherry 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 88000191 
ORVILLS WROLSTAD, * 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC and/or * 
HOME INSURANCE/ * 
HOME INDEMNITY, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On September 1, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing 
the Occupational Disease claim of the applicant in the above-referenced case. 
The applicant's claim was for medical expenses and compensation related to his 
pleural asbestosis, which the applicant claimed developed as a result of his 
exposure to asbestos during his employment with the defendant in 19 77 and 
1978. Prior to the issuance of the Order dismissing the applicant's claim, 
the Administrative Law Judge held a conference with the attorneys for the 
applicant and the defendant in which the issues raised by the defendant's 
August 5, 1988 Motion to Dismiss were discussed. In that Motion to Dismiss, 
the defendant argued that the applicant's claim failed due to his untimely 
filing of the claim. The defendant cited U. C. A. 35-2-48, which requires 
filing within one (1) year from the date the employee becomes aware of the 
occupational origin of the disease involved. In his Order issued two days 
after the conference, the Administrative Law Judge states that the applicant 
had, in fact, filed within the time limit specified in U. C. A. 35-2-48. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's claim failed 
because he did not become totally disabled from the asbestosis within one (1) 
year from the date he last worked for the defendant as required by U. C. A. 
35-2-13. For failure to mee-fc the requirements of U. C. A. 35-2-13, the 
Administrative Law Judge dismissed the applicant's Occupational Disease claim. 
On September 26, 1988, pursuant to U. C. A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for 
the applicant filed a Motion for Review. In that Motion for Review, counsel 
for the applicant argues that the Commission should sever U. C. A. 35-2-13 
from the Occupational Disease Act and decline to apply it in this case as it 
is unconstitutional. Referring to U. C. A. 35-2-13 as a "statute of repose'*, 
counsel for the applicant finds that the provision is violative of both the 
equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution and the "open courts'* clause 
of the Utah Constitution. With respect to the equal protection clause, 
counsel for the applicant states that U. C. A. 35-2-13 provides an exception 
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to the total-disability-within-one-year requirement for diseases caused by 
radiation exposure (presumably due to the known latency period involved with 
those diseases) but does not similarly provide an exception for diseases 
caused by asbestos exposure (also typically involving lengthy latency 
periods). Counsel for the applicant finds that the U. C. A, 35-2-13 
dissimilar treatment of individuals with similar diseases results in the 
provision being in violation of the equal protection clause of the Utah 
Constitution. With respect to the -open courts" clause, counsel for the 
applicant notes that U. C. A. 35-2-13 in combination with U. C. A. 35-2-3 
(which states that the benefits specified in the Occupational Disease Act are 
the sole remedy against an employer for a disease caused by the employment), 
prevents the employee with occupational asbestosis from any recovery. Counsel 
for the applicant maintains that this statutory bar to recovery makes U. C. A. 
35-2-13 violative of the "open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution. 
On October 6, 1988, counsel for the defendant filed a Response to the 
applicant's Motion for Review. In the Response, counsel for the defendant 
cites Masich v. U. S. Smelting. Refining & Mining Company, 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 
1948). From that case, counsel for the defendant quotes the Court's 
determination that the Occupational Disease Act is constitutional not 
withstanding the fact that the Act requires total disability in order for an 
employee with an occupational disease to be entitled to benefits and also bars 
the employee from a common law civil remedy. Counsel for the defendant also 
cites case law from other jurisdictions concluding that statutory bars to 
remedy for asbestosis are constitutional. 
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is the 
constitutionality of U. C. A. 35-2-13. The Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact as stated in the Administrative Law Judge's September 1, 1988 Order. The 
Commission finds it is unfortunate that the Occupational Disease Act has not 
been updated to correlate with medical advances that have linked latent 
diseases like asbestosis with occupational exposure. Although the law 
presumably needs revision to better deal with diseases like asbestosis, the 
case law cited by counsel for the defendant suggests that the current law is 
constitutional. In addition, the Commission notes that the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the Commission's awaffd*of benefits to an applicant whose husband had 
died as a result of asbestos exposure because the Court found that the 
Industrial Commission did not correctly apply the U. C. A. 35-2-13 bar to 
remedy. Tisco Intermountain vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 744 p.2d 1340 
(Utah 1987). Faced with the precedent cited above (Tisco and the Masich 
cases), the Commission finds it must affirm the Administrative Law Judge's 
denial of benefits. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's September 26, 1988 
Motion for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's September 1, 
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1988 Order is hereby affirmed and final with appeal to the Court of Appeals 
within thirty (30) days of the final agency action as specified in U. C. A. 
63-46b-12 through U. C. A. 63-46b-14 and U. C. A. 35-1-86. 
^ P U l l i i l *\ 
Stephen M. 
Chairman 
Hadley 
^miu.Mih ^  
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
sffi^ day of January, 1989. 
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Commissiotv>2Jecretary 
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